I want in this paper to consider the state of play in the theory of the relationship between central departments of state and local authorities, especially in view of. Article Where the Provincial Government violates the Constitution, laws, central government regulations, or exceeds its scope of authority while carrying out. University of Manchester. Introduction. Over the last twenty years, the nature of the relationship between local government and the central State has been the.
In the African context, the politics of ethno-regional conflict is particularly important in shaping the structure of decentralization and indeed the extent to which it is accepted at all by the ruling elite. It is difficult to find any positive assessments of these countries in the research literature. Ogborn opined that, the understanding of central-local government relations as part of a modern states government extension of surveillance across its territory is elucidated and substantiated through an analysis of the form of these relationships particularly the rationality and yields.
Chapter 4. Relationship Between Central and Local Governments - Hualien County Government Website
The paper contextualized the Zimbabwean central-local government relations within the broader framework of the pluralist theory which emphasized on interdependency, diversity and the dynamic interaction of relatively independent layers of government.
To streamline the focus of the paper, the following analytical framework was used: Machingauta noted that, although they are body corporates, local authorities remained creatures of statutes with no constitutional recognition of their existence.
In essence this implies that local government in Zimbabwe is a decentralised devolved level of governance which authority is derived from Acts of Parliament and not enshrined in the constitution. Local authorities in Zimbabwe are administered through panoply of Acts of Parliament enacted by the Zimbabwean legislature.
The various legislative instruments inter alia the Urban Councils Act, chapter The Ministry of Local Government administers all the Acts and Statutory Instruments promulgated in the local government area. The minister is supposedly considered to be acting in the best interest of the citizens. In Marchthe minister appointed a resuscitation team for the Municipality of Chitungwiza after the dismissal of key council staff including the town clerk on grounds of corruption and abuse of office.
Indeed the allegations levelled against the council officials pointed to irregularities in financial management, allocation of stands and violation of employment procedures. Organisational arrangement of central and local government from a personnel perspective The organisational and structural arrangement of local government presents an important dichotomy in understanding the manifestations of power and responsibility allocation and distribution between the parent ministry and local authorities.
The minister retains the overall supervisory, coordination and control authority on the behaviour of local authorities. However, local authorities at provincial and district levels are accountable to the minister via the Provincial Administrator P.
A and District Administrator D. One of the key result areas of D. As is to supervise and monitor local authorities and as such they are ex-officio members of full council and committees of council.
While local authorities have the power to employ non-director employees, the appointment of directors is subject to approval by the local government board in terms of section of the Urban Councils Act chapter Members of this board are appointed by the minister and therefore hold office at his discretion an issue that have raised eyebrows and controversy over the transparency of this statutory board which have been blamed of rubber stamping the whims of the minister.
Financing of local government functions-the common resource base problem Central government through Acts of parliament determines and delimits the sources from which local authorities can raise revenue for their day to day functionality. Local government revenue sources include but are not limited to service charges, rates, property tax, and grants from central government, rent on property leased, and borrowing subject to approval by the minister.
At the same time central government gets income from sources including PAYE, import and export duties, and royalties on mineral resources.
It therefore appears that central government income sources are easier to collect relative to those of local authorities. However, before implementing their budgets, local authorities must seek the approval of their tariffs and income from the minister who have the veto to reject a council budget where he feels the tariffs are beyond the affordability of citizens or where he feels the expenditure is not justifiable.
In addition to this, the common resource problem has reduced the capacity of citizens to honour both central government dues on the one hand and local authority tariffs on the other hand. Supervision and control systems and mechanisms The decentralization of functions to local authorities also came with the institutionalization of a package of control systems and supervisory mechanisms by central government to ensure that local authorities behaves within the parameters set in the relevant Acts of Parliament.
Inter-governmental relations from this angle reflect the politics of the horizontal power dynamics between local authorities and central government. Goldsmith [ 10 ] identified three ways by which central government can exercise control over local governments.
The first one is the control of local government income and expenditure. In income terms, central government may decide which taxes local governments can access or to set tax rates or to decide the form of intergovernmental transfers. In expenditure terms, central government may seek to control local government access to borrowing for capital purposes and to set limits to current expenditure levels or prohibit certain expenditures or to require localities to meet a greater or lesser proportion of the costs of certain services out of their own resources.
Secondly, there is control through a process of administrative regulation or prescription about the ways in which particular local functions or services be provided. The four dimensions of supervision of local governments by the centre he identified are the establishment of local government institutions and regulating their institutional framework. The third manner of supervision is the continuous monitoring of local government functions through requests for information and access to local government records as well as investigations into allegations of corruption and other forms of improper conduct.
In this regard, supervision may involve the suspension and or dismissal of elected councillors for improper conduct or poor performance. Lastly, is the intervention of central government by appointing administrators, commissioners or caretakers to act as council pending investigations section 80 of the Urban Councils Act Chapter However, the question is whether such tight strictures on the functioning of local authorities will enable those local authorities to realize their potential to facilitate development and sustain democracy.
The scope of innovation and responsiveness to local needs is directly to the measure of local discretion offered by the legal framework.
Whilst the Zimbabwean government has vehemently denied acknowledging such alleged excesses of control on local government, it is important to note for instance, that in the RDC Act alone, there are more than instances where the Minister can intervene in the day to day running of Rural District Councils.
The era post which coincided with the rise of the Movement of Democratic Change MDC heralded the advent of what Makumbe preferred to call a formidable opposition movement in Zimbabwe since independence.
This period evidenced a massive dissolution and dismissal of MDC led councils. Other local authorities affected included Bindura, Chinhoyi, Karoi to mention just but a few.
Accused of rebellion or treason, or in violation of the Statute for the Punishment of Corruption or the Organized Crime Prevention Act, and has been sentenced to imprisonment for not less than one year by a court of first instance; provided, however, that those in violation of the provisions that prohibits intending profit for oneself in the Statute for the Punishment of Corruption should have been sentenced to not less than imprisonment by the court of appeals.
In addition to the aforementioned, accused of crimes punishable by death or a minimum of not less than five years imprisonment, and convicted by a court of first instance. Held in custody or is at large in accordance with criminal procedures.
Detained in accordance with Statute for Prevention of Gangster. Provisions of paragraph 1 shall not apply to personnel suspended from office in accordance with paragraph 1 who is subsequently elected to the same office in accordance with law and who have taken office.
Personnel suspended from office in accordance with paragraph 1 and who has been adjudicated guilty shall be allowed to resume office before the expiration of his term unless he should be suspended from office in accordance with Article When necessary, supplementary election shall be carried out in accordance with law.
Where the court declares the election winner to be invalid, or where the court declares the election invalid thus undermining the eligibility of the winner. Where the person is accused and convicted of rebellion, treason, or corruption. Where the person has committed the offenses of Organized crime Prevention Act, convicted and sentenced to imprisonment.
Where the person has committed a crime other than the offenses set forth in the preceding two paragraphs, and has been convicted and sentenced to imprisonment without probation or if a fine is not imposed in lieu of imprisonment. Where the person is subject to rehabilitative disposition and reformatory education; provided, however, that this provision shall not apply to those subject to protective probation.
Where the household registration has been transferred outside of the administrative district for not less than four months. Where the civil rights been deprived and have not been restituted. Where the person has been declared unfit to dispose of property and where such declaration has not been rescinded. Where there are events that calls for suspension of authority and discharged from his position as stipulated by this Act. Where there are other events that calls for suspension of authority and discharged from his position in accordance with other laws.
In the event of any of the following, if the original term has yet to expire and the election agency has yet to announce the supplementary election, the punishment to suspend authority or discharge from position shall be rescinded: Where the rehabilitative disposition is rescinded in accordance with law and where reformatory education is rescinded after re-judge if the authority is suspended or if the person is discharged from position in accordance with the preceding paragraph 5.
Where the declaration that the person is unfit to dispose of property is rescinded by the court if the authority is suspended or if the person is discharged from position in accordance with the preceding paragraph 8.